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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

T. COLLINS JACKSON,
Plaintvff and Appellant}
-vs.l{ENDRICK HARWARD, BLAIN
C. CURTIS, HEBER CHRISTIANSON, McKAY LARSON, TEX R.
OLSEN, SPENCER OLIN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9000

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
In Respondents' brief it is urged that the Trial
Court's action in granting a Summary Judgment was correct because:
A. The Appellant, assuming all allegations
of his complaint are true, has pleaded no right
which may be protected at law or in equity.
B. The Appellant, assuming the allegations
of his complaint are true, has pleaded no duty on
the part of the respondents which has been violated.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
Appellant now relies to these contentions in the order
stated.

STATE11ENT OF POINTS
POINT I
A. THE APPELLANT HAS PLEADED A RIGHT WHICH
MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY.
B. THE APPELLANT HAS SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED
A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH
HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I
A. THE APPELLANT HAS PLEADED A RIGHT WHICH
MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY.

Plaintiff is required to set forth as a claiin for relief
( 1) A short and plain statenwnt of the clain1 showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief~ and
a de1nand
for judgn1ent for that relief. Rule S(a), Ctah Rules of
Civvl Procedure. The Appelant's pleadings contain these
essentials, however the Respondents, w·hile not attacking
these pleadings direetl)~. contend an absence of a primary
legal right in the Appellant, and set forth seven defimenmes.

(:n

The first clain1ed deficiency alleges no license or
pennit frmn the :U..,ederal Connnunications Connnission or
rrmn an)· other goYPrmnental or adn1inistratiYe body.
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The simple answer to this is that none is required. See
F.C.C. Docket 12443, where it is said:
16. In a l\1emorandum Opnion and Order
adopted by the Cmnmission on April 2, 1958 (In
the Matter of Frontier Broadcasting Company,
et al., Complainant, v. J. E. Collier and Carol 0.
1\::rummel, db/as Laramie Community TV Conlpany, et al., defendant), the Commission announced its conclusion that it does not possess
licensing or regulatory jurisdiction over community antenna television systems. We may here
note briefly the basis on which the conclusion of
non-jurisdiction over CATV systems was reached.
First, it was concluded that they are not carriers.
Second, even assuming they were carriers, their
operations are typically intrastate, whereas the
Act gives the Commission regulatory jurisdiction
over only these common carriers operating facilities which provide interstate or foreign communications service. Finally, it seemed clear that. since
their operation is confined to the transmission
of television programs to subscribers over closed
circuit cable systems, there is no basis on which
to assume licensing or regulatory powers over
CATV systems as users of the radio spectrum
under Title III of the Communications Act.
The second and third claimed deficiencies allege that
Appellant has no franchise from Sevier County, in violation of Article XII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution and
Section 17-5-39, Utah Code Annotated (1953) or from
any municipality within Sevier County, in violation of
the same constitutional provisions and Section 10-8-1-1-,
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Utah Code Annotated (1953). Appellant has admitted
that he has no such franchise and has answered by way
of interrogatory number 10 that he claims the right to
operate without formal franchise, by user and implied
consent from the governing body of Sevier County. This
raises a genuine issue of fact. l\1oreover, the Constitutional and Statutory provisions cited by Respondent do not
require that Appellant obtain a franchise as a condition
precedent to doing business nor do they take from Appellant the right to conduct his business. They merely
grant to these governing bodies the right to require franchises under certain conditions. At no time material
to this lawsuit has any governing body within Sevier
County enacted a resolution requiring that Appellant obtain a franchise.
The fourth claimed deficiency alleges that during all
times material to these proceedings _.._-\._ppellant has been
subject to a contract authorizing the use of utility poles
for carrying his line, which provides as a condition precedent that he rnust secure all local franchises required
by law. What has been said above in answer to claimed
deficiencies two and three are equally applicable to this
fourth clai1ned deficiency. Even if the terms of the contract were violated, ·which Appellant denies. this would
only give rise to a dispute between the contracting parties, nauwl~· Telluride Power Cmupany and Appellant,
and would not destro~· any primar~· legal rights of Appellant.
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The fifth clai1ned deficiency alleges that at all times
material to these proceedings, Appellant has operated
under an unregistered assumed name, contrary to the
provisions of Section 42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953). Violation of this provision does not take any of
the legal- rights of the offender, but renders an offender
guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 42-2-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953). The purpose of this statute is to give
notice to the public of the nan1e or nmnes of persons conducting or owning a business, and to protect those who
would transact business with persons under an assumed
name. Putnam v. The Industrial Commi'ssion, 80 Utah
187, 14 P. 2d 973. Respondents make no claim that they
or any other person has been misled. It has also been held
that provisions for assumed nmnes are inapplicable to
torts. See 38 Am. Jur. 600.
The sixth and seventh claimed deficiencies alleged
that Appellant has been capturing a fugitive television
signal without paying any consideration for or contributing to the production thereof and that he is a "receiver"
rather than a "broadcaster" and as a receiver is attempting to "reap where he has not sown." Appellant contends
that this claimed defiviency is wholly immaterial. The
pleadings claiming damages will necessitate findings of
fact showing the inveshnent Appellant has in this business, in such things as master antennae located high on
mountain peaks, frmn which lead wires and pole lines
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extend over great distances to customers' receiving sets.
Appellant's business is recognized and duplicated by
other such entrepreneurs all over the United States. The
case of Scroll Realty Corp. v; Mandell, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 813
(N.Y. 1949), involved the question whether a tenant in an
apartinent house could maintain a television antenna on
the roof in view of a lease provision forbidding drilling
into any part of the building. That court held that the
provision precluded such antenna, but went on to say that
it 1night be realistic and practical to provide a n1aster
.aerial on the apartment house from which leader lines
could be run to the various tenants, providing for a fair
and reasonable rental for such service. In a case before
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1956, in order to
decide a tax 1natter, the Court described

th~ ~unction

of

a business analagous to Appellant's. There a community
antenna system was described as consisting of "the gathering, transn1ission and delivery of broadcast sound and
picture television signals frmn owned central high towers
located on land leased or owned by it ... '' The description goes on to recite that the entrepreneurs collect a
connection charge plus a 1nonthly seiTiee fee. Lilly r.
United States,

:2~~8

F.:2d 58-1: (4th Cir. 1956). For further

evidence of the recognition of this sort of conduct as a
lm~inP~~ possP~sing

inherent rights see F.O.C. Docket

N u m!Jcrs 11611, 11331, 1:211G, and 1:2-1:-1:3. The fact of the
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matter is, Appellant and his counterparts elsewhere, far
from conducting a business without paying any consideration therefore (or reaping where he has not sown), have
invested substantial sums in supplying television to areas
not capable of receiving the signal from the mother transmitting station. The other cases cited by Respondent
under this heading are not in point, for there are no issues
raised in the pleadings pertaining to proprietary rights
of the product televised such as a heavyweight fight, I
Love Lucy, or other shows which are copyrighted. The
issue here is more nearly analagous to a person contaminating the water of a private water supply system.
B. THE APPELLANT HAS SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED
A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH
HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

The Appellant clain1s that he has sufficiently pleaded
a duty on the part of Respondents by his allegations in
the first cause of action in trespass; second cause of
action in negligence; third cause of action in nuisance;
fourth cause of action in inducing breach of contract;
fifth cause of action in conspiracy; and sixth cause of
action for punative relief for malice. These actions were
all known at common law.
Respondent contends variously that they have no
duty because they have sovereign iminunity for their
acts, because except for defendants Olin and Larson they
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are all elected County Officials; also that their conduct
is lawful; and that Appellant seeks to take advantage of
the federal licensing statute for broadcasting, for his own
advantage to eliminate cmnpetition.
Each defense asserted under this section of their reply necessarily argues genuine issues of fact to reach
the proffered conclusion. Respondents say that they
were compelled to supply television to Sevier County by
the provision of Section 11-2-1, and 11-:2-:2, [Ttah Code
Annotated (1953). That statute restricted the governing
bodies to the use of translators, but the Respondents did
not follow the Statute. Appellant's complaint alleges that
the Respondents are using boosters without- first obtaining a license, contrary to federal law. (See complaint,
paragraph 5.) Respondents have neither admitted nor
denied this allegation. Appellant concedes that elective
county officials are immune fron1liability when performing their governmental functions, but ~lppellant is unable to understand how Respondents can invoke this immunity without pleading it, and without resolving the
issue as to whether they are cmnplying with the very
statute from which they seek their in1n1unity.
Respondents' point that Appellant is seeking to
eliminate his emnpetition is both inunaterial and absurd.
Their brief attl'mpts to equate their own failure to haYl'
an :B-,.C.C.license for an unlicenseable booster, with Appel-
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lants failure to have an F.C.C. license. This simply ignores the rules of the federal statutes set forth in paragrapll five of Appellant's complaint and the decisions of
the F.C.C., see F.O.O. Docket nttmbers 111611, 11331,
12116 and 12443. As previously shown, Appellant does
not require a license.
Appellant has laid his complaint on common law
causes of action, asking for redress for wrongs committed
directly against hiin. This is not an application before
the Federal Communications Commission to determine
who should get a license, or whether someone is broadcasting in violation of any license.
Finally, Respondents take cmnfort from the case of
C. J. Community Servi,ces v. F.O.O., 246 F. 2d 660, and
chide Appellant for maintaining that "boosters are still
unlawful." Only a cursory reading of that case will
demonstrate that this is the case that extends beyond any
doubt that the F.C.C. has the smne jurisdiction over television broadcasting that it previously held, unquestionably, over radio. The dictum of the case suggested that
the :B-,.C.C. look into the feasibility of booster television.
The F.-C.C. Dockets referred to, supra, are conclusive of
the question that the F.C.C. has studied this issue both before and after the decision and that they are still unlicenseable and therefore illegal.
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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff and Appellant has pleaded a right which
may be protected at law and in equity and has pleaded
a duty on the part of Respondent, which has been violated. The Trial Court erred in granting the l\1otion for
Summary Judgment since genuine issues of fact material
to the cause of plaintiff and Appellant are outstanding.
The judgment of the Trial Court should therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for a
trial on the merits of the case.
Respectfully submitted,

BEN D. BROWNING, and
JOHN H. ALLEN

Attorneys for Appellant,
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake ·City 1, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

